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The USSR's strategy in Afghanistan almost succeeded. Following the 
withdrawal of their troops in February 1989, Soviet officials sought a negotiated 
settlement that would have provided their local allies with a significant chance 
to remain in power yet would have reduced the USSR's economic and diplo-
matic costs. By withdrawing its forces, Moscow purposefully transformed a 
war of liberation against an occupying power into a confused civil conflict 
between a seemingly flexible government and an increasingly divided opposi-
tion. The insurgents' foreign backers, disappointed by their poor military 
performance, wavered in their support. Only the unexpected collapse of the 
Soviet central government undermined Moscow's endgame in Afghanistan. 
THE INCOMPLETE GENEVA ACCORDS 
On IS April 1988, in Geneva, Switzerland, various parties to the Afghan 
conflict signed four pacts: a Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of 
Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual 
Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-intervention; a Declara-
tion on International Guarantees Between the United States and the Soviet 
Union; a Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and, an 
Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation relating 
to Afghanistan, also signed by the Afghan and Pakistani governments. As part 
of this set of accords, Soviet officials consented to remove their military units 
from Afganistan by IS February 1989. 
The Geneva accords were incomplete in several respects, and these gaps 
ensured fighting would continue. First, before the treaty signing Soviet officials 
had rejected an American proposal mat both superpowers terminate their 
military assistance to their Afghan allies after the Red Army's withdrawal. 
Unable to obtain an agreement on such "negative symmetry," the 
US administration insisted on its right to arm the resistance as long as the USSR 
provided weapons to Kabul. Although Soviet officials never explicitly agreed 
to such "positive symmetry," they signed the accords fully cognizant of the 
American position. Not only had US officials previously explained their views 
to their Soviet counterparts, but the State Department also had submitted an 
official statement to the UN Secretary-General which asserted that "the 
U.S. retains the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide 
military assistance to parties in Afghanistan." Second, none of the various 
resistance groups (commonly referred to as the mujaheddin) had participated 
directly in the negotiations, and many opposition leaders expressed open 
hostility to the resulting accords. Thud, both the American and Pakistani 
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governments previously had dropped their demands for the establishment of an 
interim Afghan government before the Soviet troop withdrawal. Instead, they 
merely agreed that Diego Cordovez would continue his UN-sponsored media-
tion efforts. The failure of the accords to specify the nature of Afghanistan's 
future government, combined with Cordovez' inability to make much progress 
in his diplomatic rounds, meant that the Afghan disputants sought to resolve this 
question by force of arms.1 
It is of course questionable whether the peace agreement could have 
been any better from the West's point of view. Gorbachev had refused to 
involve the USSR in attempts to alter the composition of the Kabul government, 
which he maintained on 9 February 1988 was "a purely internal Afghan issue." 
He added that, "When it is hinted to us that the Soviet Union should take part in 
talks on the issue of a coalition government, or even talk to third countries, our 
answer is firm and clean it is none of our business. Or yours, for that matter."2 
In addition, Soviet officials repeatedly had indicated their intention to withdraw 
their troops even without an international agreement, so fighting would have 
continued in any case unless the resistance or President Najibullah's Kabul 
government had changed their policies. 
Before leaving, the Red Army had turned over large quantities of 
military supplies to the Afghan government, fulfilling Soviet Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze 's vow to the Kabul government that the USSR would "not 
leave it in need."3 Soviet military forces also stepped up their attacks against the 
guerrillas using advanced weaponry which they had failed to employ previously 
in Afghanistan, including long-range Scud missiles, Mig-27 airplanes, and 
Backfire bombers.4 Even after the departure of their forces, Soviet advisers 
continued to train the Afghan military.5 Soviet and Afghan officials concluded 
that if they could prevent a quick guerrilla victory, their fortunes would steadily 
improve. An Afghan government official correctly observed that, "Najibullah 
wins by not losing, and the mujaheddin lose by not winning."6 
THE UNEXPECTED MILITARY STALEMATE 
After the Soviet withdrawal, Afghan government troops proved unex-
pectedly successful at attaining their minimum objective of retaining control of 
the cities. The insurgents, so skilled at guerrilla warfare, were unable to defeat 
government forces in large-scale conventional warfare such as that surrounding 
the city of Jalalabad in the spring of 1989. With a few minor exceptions, such 
as me defection of die garrison at Tarin Kot in October 1990 and die seizure of 
Khost in March 1991, they sought in vain to force die surrender or desertion of 
major government positions through sieges and rocket attacks. Their inability 
to capture a major city prevented diem from moving tiieir Pakistani-based 
interim government, established in February 1989, to Afghanistan. Such a 
transfer would have assisted die government's quest to gain official recognition 
from such countries as die United States. The insurgents' failure to attain 
decisive military victories bodi alarmed dieir external backers and improved die 
government forces' morale. Yet, despite their air superiority, die latter felt 
compelled to abandon much of die countryside to die various guerrilla groups.7 
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The resistance organizations' inability to resolve their political and 
religious differences hampered their operations. Not only did divisions widen 
between the banian-based Alliance of Eight and the Alliance of Seven operating 
from Pakistan, with the Seven's provisional government in Peshawar refusing 
to join with the Shiite groups allied to Iran, but even the Pakistani-based Sunni 
groups disagreed on such fundamental issues as the structure of the future 
government and the role of religion in Afghan politics. Held reports indicated 
mat guerrilla forces persistently failed to coordinate their operations and, more 
seriously, ambushed and assassinated one another's members. Frequent 
endeavors to form joint councils or other lasting alliances consistently failed. 
The insurgents confronted a collective action problem. Although it was in their 
common interest to depose the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA), each faction preferred that its rivals bore the brunt of accomplishing 
this debilitating task. Guerrilla commanders also regularly ignored instructions 
frommeirnominalpoliticalleadershipinPreshawar. These divisions wimin the 
resistance strengthened the government's hand. Aleadingguerrillacommander 
remarked that, "Najibullah is not surviving because he is strong, because people 
like him, or because people are willing to fight and die for him It's only 
because there is no political alternative."8 
Although the Kabul government also suffered from factionalism, 
Najibullah succeeded, particularly after an unsuccessful coup attempt in early 
March 1990, in removing important officials in the PDPA opposed to his 
moderate line.9 The government also reached local agreements (mostly truces) 
with many guerrilla commanders, thus further dividing the resistance.10 In late 
November 1990 Najibullah even held direct exploratory talks in Geneva with 
unidentified moderate resistance leaders — as well as representatives of the 
former Afghan King, Zahir Shah — in an obvious effort to further exploit 
fissures within the opposition. The President observed after die meeting that, 
"Such talks will continue, and I am satisfied with those I had."" 
IMPROVEMENT IN THE USSR's REGIONAL POSITION 
Moscow's diplomatic position in aie region strengthend significantly 
after die Red Army's withdrawal. For example, even before die pull-out's 
completion, Indian officials had expressed their support for die USSR's view 
that only a coalition government, not force, could resolve die Afghan conflict. 
Alarmed by die prospects of a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul, in June 1988 
former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi openly indicated his preferrencefor 
a continuation of die PDPA regime radier tiian die rule of "die sort of fanatical 
fundamentalists who are die alternatives."12 After die completion of die Soviet 
military withdrawal, Indian officials strengthened tiieir relations witii die Kabul 
government According to one regional expert, They went out of their way to 
befriend Afghan President Najibullah in early 1989, at a time when die Soviets 
seemed ready to write him off."13 They also repeatedly criticized Pakistan and 
die United States for providing military assistance to die Afghan guerrillas.14 
Although they continued to aid various resistance groups, in part to 
counterbalance die influence of Saudi Arabia,13 Iranian officials moved towards 
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the USSR's viewpoint on the Afghan question shortly after the Soviet troops 
withdrew. According to Soviet sources, the banians expressed support for a 
nonaligned Afghan government which included elements of the PDPA.16 A 
Western analyst maintains that when they met in Moscow in June 1989, 
Gorbachev and Iranian leader Ali Akbar Rafsanjani "made an informal deal to 
ensure territorial stability in Central Asia."17 Editorials in the government-
controlled Tehran Times subsequently praised Najibullah and suggested direct 
talks between Iran and the Afghan government18 Najibullah remarked in 
November 1990 that Iran's policy had seen a "very positive change toward a 
political solution."19 The Iranian government's position accorded with its desire 
to improve relations with the USSR, reduce American influence in the area, and 
constrain resistance groups supported by Saudi Arabia.20 
The USSR's relations with Pakistan, the resistance's strongest regional 
supporter, also improved. Realizing the centrality of Pakistan's support for the 
insurgents, Moscow continued to provide the country with significant economic 
assistance despite criticizing its government's policy towards Afghanstan.21 
The Soviet government's relatively benign policy, combined with the guerril-
las' military failures, resulted in a hesitant but noticeable moderation in 
Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan. The head of the Pakistani army said 
in September 1989 that the resistance should negotiate with the PDPA if 
Najibullah resigned.22 Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif warned in April 
1991 that the reduction in Western assistance to Pakistan compelled his 
government to reevaluate its regional policies.23 At approximately the same 
time senior intelligence officials from Pakistan met in Geneva with their Afghan 
counterparts to discuss a possible settlement.24 The Pakistani government 
subsequently endorsed a five-point peace plan proposed by UN Secretary-
General Javier Perez de Cuellar in May and supported by the USSR. The 
scheme envisaged a cease-fire, the termination of foreign arms shipments, an 
"intra-Afghan dialogue," and a transitional administration to supervise elec-
tions leading to a nonaligned Islamic government29 A Pakistani envoy visited 
Moscow at the end of May to discuss the peace process with Soviet officials. 
Nikolai Kozyrev, the senior Soviet diplomat assigned to the Afghan question, 
ebulliently remarked that, "The mere fact that such talks were held after a three-
year break can be regarded as a sign of the changing attitude of Pakistan towards 
unblocking the Afghan conflict."26 Although the Pakistani government (more 
precisely, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate) persevered in directing 
the resistance's military campaign, many officials evinced increasing interest in 
a political solution to the Afghan conflict and were patently disturbed by recent 
American policies in south Asia (particularly heightened American pressure in 
the area of nuclear nonproliferation).27 
Many West European governments also wavered in their support for the 
resistance. During the final stages of the Soviet troop withdrawal, they had 
followed the American lead and recalled their diplomatic staff from Kabul, 
allegedly to guarantee their personal safety. Shevardnadze criticized the move 
as a "deficit of responsibility or a political demarche."28 Despite strong 
US objections, the French and Italian governments decided in 1990 to return 
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their diplomats to Kabul.29 Their decisions lessened the Afghan government's 
diplomatic isolation and strengthened its international legitimacy. 
Support wimin the United States for the guerrillas also waned. Faced 
with a recession at home, the end of the Cold War, me support of many resistance 
groups for Iraq during the Gulf War, a rise of drug trafficking in guerrilla-
controlled areas, and a military stalemate in Afghanistan, even some of the 
resistance's strongest Congressional backers began to endorse a reduction in 
US military assistance to the guerrillas. An official in the Bush administration 
explained "that the voices calling for an end to die program are getting louder 
and that every year it gets harder and harder to justify assistance in the absence 
of results."30 
RESOLVING DISPUTES OVER EXTERNAL MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE 
Soviet officials continued to decry American aid to the resistance. One 
commentator observed in Izvestia that, "Washington's present policy with 
respect to Afghanistan is another manifestation of the chronic 'disease' of the 
thinking of some right-wing figures [there]. One can call it an 'imperial 
mentality.' It displays itself in pretensions of trying to impose on other countries 
and peoples arrangements pleasing to Washington."31 Soviet officials claimed 
that Pakistan and die United States were violating die Geneva accords by 
continuing to provide the insurgents military support32 
With respect to their own policies, Soviet officials initially insisted that 
the many bilateral understandings existing between the USSR and Afghanistan, 
as well as the Geneva accords, granted diem the right to continue supplying the 
Kabul government with military assistance.33 Once die government's success 
in me ground war became clearer, however, Soviet officials concluded mat 
"negative symmetry" would best promote tiieir interests. As soon as me USSR 
had completed its military withdrawal, and had finished delivering large stocks 
of weaponry to government forces, Gorbachev personally wrote to Bush to 
request that both countries terminate their military aid to their Afghan allies. 
hi a sharp policy reversal, US officials now rejected the idea of a mutual 
arms cut-off, though American negotiators had originally proposed me concept. 
The administration claimed it had to match die ordnance die USSR's departing 
military units left government forces, as well as die military advisers and 
additional defense assistance die USSR continued to supply Kabul. Testifying 
before me Senate Armed Services Committee in February 1990, General 
H. Norman Schwarzkopf observed diat, "People have been asking how Najibullah 
could be holding out so long. Well, he's holding out because he's getting an 
absolutely unbelievable amount of Soviet aid."34 Akhough analysts might doubt 
whemer Moscow actually had much of an independent impact in sustaining me 
regime when odier factors (such as divisions widtin die resistance and rivalries 
among tiieir external backers) also bolstered it, an on-tiie-spot observer stressed 
me importance of Soviet policies in upholding die Afghan government and 
uiereby justifies dûs article's focus on Ate USSR. "Moscow's commitment in 
economic and military aid to die Kabul regime has been vasdy underestimated 
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by the West and by Pakistan," Ahmed Rashid wrote in late 1989. "The flow of 
Soviet food, fuel and weapons has played a determining role in sustaining the 
Afghan economy and allowing President Najibullah to conduct his political 
strategy of maintaining public morale and winning over the mujahideen."35 In 
1990 observers gauged the level of annual Soviet economic and military 
assistance to the Afghan government at about two to six billion dollars, and they 
estimated that the United States provided approximately 300 million dollars a 
year in defense support to the insurgents.36 They believed that Saudi sources 
supplied an amount roughly comparable to that of the United States.37 
American officials also acknowledged that they initially had opposed a 
superpower arms cut-off because it would have inhibited the guerrillas from 
obtaining their expected military victory. As one of them explained to The 
Washington Post, "If you favor negative symmetry, you favor a coalition 
government approach. Negative symmetry would assure that the Kabul govern-
ment becomes a permanent factor."38 Once they concluded in late 1990 that the 
guerrillas were unlikely to soon achieve a military triumph, American officials 
reversed their position yet again and agreed in principle that the superpowers 
should terminate their defense assistance programs. By this time, however, 
Soviet officials had upped die ante. Also noticing the improvement in the Kabul 
government's military position, they maintained that other countries, particu-
larly Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, should halt military shipments to the insur-
gents.39 In addition, they indicated that they expected a cease-fire and an intra-
Afghan dialogue to accompany such an arrangement Subsequent negotiations 
focused on these and other issues, including the effective date of the cut-off and 
verification procedures. 
SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER ISSUES 
Aside from the question of arms deliveries, the most divisive point 
requiring resolution was what to do with Najibullah and the PDPA. Until 1990 
US negotiators maintained that, as a condition for commencing negotiations, 
the President and his party had to leave office.40 The resistance also refused to 
join a coalition government with the PDPA, participate in any elections 
organized by die regime, or hold direct talks with PDPA representatives. The 
farthest they would proceed in public was to talk with UN and Soviet mediators 
who were also in contact with the Afghan government 
Soviet officials rejected such demands. They termed a proposal by the 
British Foreign Secretary mat Najibullah and the PDPA surrender their posi-
tions "gross interference in the affairs of a sovereign country."41 After Soviet 
troops had completed their withdrawal, Shevardnadze indicated at a press 
conference in Pakistan mat the PDPA was prepared to accept a "far-reaching 
compromise" but it "did not intend to capitulate."42 Soviet representatives 
expressed support for a coalition government or council, composed of "all strata 
of Afghan society, including the PDPA."43 They termed the Peoples' Demo-
cratic Party of Afghanistan "the most outstanding and well-organized force in 
Afghan society."44 In December 1989 the USSR dispatched a delegation to 
Kabul to help overcome splits wimin the PDPA.45 Soviet officials supported 
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NajibuUah's endeavors to win over the moderate opposition through a policy of 
"national reconciliation." For example, the Foreign Ministry openly hailed his 
November talks at Geneva.46 They also encouraged the Afghan government to 
continue its domestic reform program which, if successful, could garner the 
regime further support among the population. In 1990 the Afghan government 
modified its constitution to permit other political parties to contest elections (and 
hence renounced the PDPA's monopoly of power). Najibullah also appointed 
individuals who were not PDPA members to a majority of cabinet posts 
(including the Prime Ministership). The PDPA itself was rechristened the 
Hezb-i Watan ("Fatherland Party") in July 1990, and now required its members 
to practice Islam. The Afghan government introduced reforms in the economy 
and other areas as well.47 
Soviet officials also repeatedly called for a cease-fire, which of course 
would have left their allies in control of Afghanistan's urban core, and urged a 
greater role for the United Nations in the resolution of the conflict48 In addition, 
they apparently considered granting the former king a role in any settlement In 
late November 1989 Shevardnadze met with the monarch in Rome.49 The 
following November, according to Afghan sources, Gorbachev was in personal 
contact with the king during his own visit to Italy.30 Soviet officials claimed to 
desire "an unallied and neutral Afghanistan, hostile to no one."31 They proposed 
international talks among the USSR, Pakistan, Iran, and other countries to 
resolve the war and help determine the country's international status.32 
Although seeking a negotiated settlement, Soviet officials promoted an 
outcome favorable to their local clients. This trend became particularly evident 
after Najibullah successfully overcame the March coup attempt and clearly 
became the stronger local power.53 Najibullah now appeared capable of 
maintaining stability in Afghanistan. Soviet officials did not want to lose him 
unless a comparable stable government enjoying a wider base of support, could 
emerge. AfterSecretary of State James Bakerindicatedduringatripto Moscow 
in February 1990 that the United States had accepted NajibuUah's temporary 
continuation in office, Soviet representatives affirmed that the Afghan people 
should determine their future government in national elections supervised by the 
United Nations and the Islamic Conference. But they initiaUy balked when 
American representatives demanded that Najibullah transfer during the elec-
toral process much of his powers, including control over the armed forces, the 
media, and the secret police, to an interim authority consisting of representatives 
from diverse sectors of Afghan society.34 In April a senior Soviet official, 
aUuding to the Afghan government's superior military position, stated that the 
failure of the resistance and Washington to negotiate directly with Najibullah 
showed they had not yet appreciated "present realities."55 Kozyrev said in June 
that The American demand for Mr. NajibuUah to resign and hand over power 
to an interim government is totally unrealistic. It would be capitulation, and that 
would be impossible."56 In August 1990 Soviet and Afghan officials yielded on 
this issue and agreed to the establishment of a coordination body to implement 
the elections, but did not want to delegate the extensive powers Washington 
desired. (Although Yuli M. Vorontsov, Soviet Ambassador to the United 
Nations, reportedly had proposed in July to his US counterpart that Najibullah 
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relinquish control of the military, the media, and the secret police to another 
authority, Soviet officials never formally repeated what perhaps was the 
diplomat's personal suggestion.57) After Najibullah met in August with senior 
Soviet officials (including Gorbachev) in Moscow, a TASS account reported 
that, 
The Soviet spokesman pointed to the importance of the fact that 
President Najibullah confirmed his intention to create a coordi-
nating body, which will function during die transition period and 
in which all Afghan political forces will be represented. In 
addition, the Afghan government has announced its agreement 
to transfer to this coordinating body some ministerial functions 
and even subordinate to it some units of the Afghan army and 
Interior Ministry troops on condition that armed rebel units will 
be subordinated to it, too.58 
Soviet officials continued to maintain that a cease-fire should precede a military 
aid cut-off, and that the termination of arms shipments should occur before the 
formation of the interim authority. They argued that the latter had to include 
Najibullah.59 
Diplomatic progress during the rest of 1990 and the first part of 1991 was 
minimal. Although Baker and Shevardnadze discussed the Afghan conflict at 
their meetings in August and December 1990, American officials were dis-
tracted by events in the Middle East while their Soviet counterparts were 
preoccupied with domestic issues. The sporadic direct talks between Soviet and 
resistance representatives succeeded neither in determining a future Afghan 
government nor in freeing the USSR's prisoners of war.60 The shuttle mission 
of Benon Sevan, Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General, also 
proved fruitless. The guerrillas' unexpected seizure at Khost encouraged the 
Bush administration to stand fast A State Department official, euphoric over 
the insurgent victory, justified maintaining a firm position: "If the Soviets see 
they are throwing good money after bad, we hope the Soviets will come to see 
that a political settlement is necessary."61 
Soviet officials advanced a similar logic. Kozyrev argued that Mos-
cow's arms deliveries actually promoted the attainment of apolitical settlement: 
"The opposition respects strength and, seeing mat its attempts to settle the 
problem by military means are futile, it will have to agree to compromises and 
peaceful negotiations."62 The USSR intensified its arms deliveries.63 
THE COLLAPSE 
The failure of the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow broke the 
impasse. Many of the Soviet officials subsequently purged were closely 
associated with Moscow's hardline policy in Afghanistan.64 As in so many 
areas, even before die foiled coup Boris Yeltsin had adopted an independent 
policy toward Afghanistan by meeting directly with resistance leaders and by 
vowing to curtail arms deliveries from his Russian republic to the Kabul 
government.65 He and the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyryev, repeat-
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edly indicated they wanted to reexamine Soviet policies in Afghanistan, 
particularly the aid program.66 
Soviet officials now made several important concessions. They agreed 
in mid-September to a cessation on 1 January 1992 of "lethal material and 
supplies" to the Afghan combatants from the United States and the USSR. 
Although the superpowers urged other countries to follow suit, the termination 
of Soviet and American arms deliveries was not conditional on their participa-
tion. The USSR in effect curtailed all weapons deliveries to the Afghan 
government while permitting countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to 
continue to arm the resistance. In addition, while still insisting that "neither we 
nor the Americans can force Najibullah to resign until he decides this himself,"67 
Soviet officials stopped insisting that a cease-fire precede and the establishment 
of an interim authority follow the arms cut-off. Instead, the Soviet-American 
agreement merely called for a cease-fire and indicated that the United Nations 
should take the lead in supervising free elections and the transition to "a new 
broad-based government," a process which should reflect "an intra-Afghan 
dialogue."68 UN officials are currently seeking to hold a multinational confer-
ence to resolve the conflict 
The issue that presently preoccupies Russian officials is the fate of the 
estimated 75 to 300 Soviet prisoners-of-war in resistance hands.69 Some resist-
ance leaders refuse to release their POW's until certain conditions are met 
Stipulations cited in the media include a halt to all Russian military aid to the 
Kabul regime, the release of guerrillas captured by the government, the resig-
nation of Najibullah, official Soviet recognition of the mujaheddin, and postwar 
reparations to compensate Afghanistan for the damage inflicted by Soviet 
policies.70 Representatives from four of the seven resistance parties based in 
Peshawar visited Moscow from 11-15 November 1991. The two sides issued a 
joint communique in which, in return for a commitment by the participating 
resistance organizations to commence releasing groups of Soviet POW's by 1 
January 1992, the Russian government reaffirmed its pledge to curtail its arms 
shipments after this date, denounced the 1979 Soviet invasion, expressed 
support for an Islainic transitional government to implement tbe UN peace plan, 
called on the Islamic Conference and the UN to supervise the anticipated 
national elections, and pledged to withdraw its military personnel from Afghani-
stan.71 (Resistance leaders subsequently accused the Russian government of 
violating the agreement72) Financial assistance from the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union to the ruling Watan party also ended after the coup attempt73 
In an largely unsuccessful endeavor to free Soviet POW's, Russian Vice 
President Alexander Rutskoi visited'Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in mid-
December. In what surely foreshadows a growing role for the Central Asian 
republics in the Afghan conflict, Rutskoi called for a joint commission consist-
ing of representatives of all the countries in the region (including Russia, 
Azerbaijan, Kazhakistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan) as well as the Afghan 
resistance to monitor the implementation of the UN peace plan.74 In his meetings 
with Afghan officials, the Russian Vice President pledged continued economic 
and technical aid for the government and stated his intention to urge Afghani-
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Stan's neighbors to block all military assistance to the Afghan combatants. But 
their joint communique made no reference to any future Russian military 
cooperation with the Kabul regime, regardless of other governments ' policies.75 
EXPLAINING MOSCOW'S POLICY 
Soviet policy towards Afghanistan between 1989 and early 1991 is 
puzzling. During this period the USSR gracefully abandoned Eastern Europe, 
dismantled much of its conventional military establishment, and wrote off its 
clients in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. Yet, the USSR vigorously 
exerted itself to sustain its Afghan allies. 
The reason for such odd behavior is that Soviet officials were torn by 
conflicting objectives. On the one hand, they desired to reduce the economic 
burden of propping up the Kabul government with military assistance and 
especially food aid, most of which arrived by costly air transport. The Soviet 
public had expressed increasing hostility towards the provision of economic 
assistance to Moscow's Third World allies. One Western diplomat based in 
Pakistan observed, "I can't see that the Soviets are going to keep pumping in 
food and fuel to Kabul when there's not bread on the table in Leningrad and 
Minsk."76 A negotiated settlement would have reduced the USSR's costs by 
prohibiting additional arms transfer to Afghanistan and by increasing the 
prospects that international agencies and foreign governments would have 
provided economic assistance to the Kabul government. 
Soviet public opinion also affected Moscow's policies towards the 
conflict in other ways. Even for reasons unrelated to the economic cost of 
sustaining their Afghan allies, many Soviet observers seemed dissatisfied with 
the USSR's continued involvement in the war despite the removal of the Soviet 
expeditionary force. Some authors evinced cynicism when describing the 
conflict For example, a Soviet analyst in New Times observed that, 
People in the Soviet Union may think that the war in Afghanistan 
is one between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries, be-
tween progressive and conservative forces, between those who 
want to keep the nation in die past and those who steer it towards 
abrighterfuture. This impression has nothing to do with reality. 
The war in Afghanistan is a struggle for power waged by 
different clans. Few people believe in the ideological banners, 
be they red or green, which are used as a camouflage of this 
struggle.77 
Other aumors expressed bitterness: "No matter how we try to explain our 
military supply line to die Najibullah regime, die main victims of 'made in me 
USSR' [weapons] are women and children, ordinary citizens."78 For many, die 
war no doubt rekindled horrendous memories of die deam of numerous Soviet 
soldiers in senseless battles. 
An additional factor motivating Moscow's desire to reduce its presence 
in Afghanistan was that Soviet officials desired to remove tins troublesome 
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reminder of an era of East-West confrontation, a conflict which still aroused 
anti-Soviet sentiment among some Western circles. The Wall Street Journal, 
for example, complained in July 1990 that, "It is preposterous for the Soviet 
Union to be pouring billions of dollars worth of military supplies into Afghani-
stan while pleading with the West for aid."79 At practically every meeting 
between senior Soviet and American officials since 1979, Afghanistan was a 
topic of negotiations. 
A complete end to the fighting would have further improved the USSR's 
image in the West and increased its chances of obtaining additional economic 
assistance at a time when, because of the perceived conservative reaction 
preceding the August coup, doubts were increasing about the Soviet govern-
ment's commitment to domestic reform. 
Although the above considerations pushed Soviet officials towards a 
negotiated settlement of the Afghan conflict, other factors prevented them from 
abandoning the Najibullah regime completely. They correctly perceived that 
the United States eventually would lose interest in the conflict Shortly after the 
Soviet troop pull-out, a commentary in Izvestia laid out a preferred scenario 
whereby the United States, "having lost faim in the opposition's possibility of 
winning a military victory, adjusts its policy with respect to Afghanistan to the 
opposition'sdetriment"80 Soviet officials also may have hoped to neutralize the 
resistance's other main external supporters, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
by diplomatic means. 
Another trend which encouraged Soviet officials to hold fast on Af-
ghanistan was the increasing possibility that moderate resistance leaders and 
theirforeign backers would reach some kind of agreement with the government 
In meetings with Soviet observers, Najibullah stressed his commitment to 
reform his regime to make it more acceptable to the Afghan people and the 
international community.81 The Geneva meetings and other government-
resistance contacts, combined with changes in Iranian and Pakistani attitudes 
toward the conflict, suggested that Najibullah could convince some of his 
domestic and foreign opponents to deal with him. 
Soviet officials might have hoped the Afghan government would gain 
additional popular support once Soviet troops departed the country. A diminu-
tion in the USSR's overt presence shouldhave made Afghans perceiveNajibullah 
less as a Soviet puppet and thus enhanced his popular support Indeed,amajor 
factor differentiating Afghhanistan from Eastern Europe was that the Afghan 
government enjoyed the support of some sectors of the population. Techno-
crats, women, communists, and others fearful of a resistance committed to an 
Islamic government seemed to prefer, if not Najibullah himself, at least his 
policies. 
Soviet officials also desired to preserve a forward defense against the 
spread of Muslim fundamentalism in the USSR's Central Asian republics. They 
repeatedly stressed that, given Afghanistan's proximity, the USSR had a 
legitimate interest in its domestic situation. As Shevardnadze explained, 
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We are not indifferent to the fate of Afghanistan and the Afghan 
people.... That country is our neighbor, a traditional and close 
partner Therefore mere is nothing strange in the fact that, 
although we have withdrawn our forces, we are by no means 
indifferent to future developments in Afghan affairs H 
When Baker pointedly asked Shevardnadze in July 1989 why the USSR 
continued to supply the Afghan government with such assistance, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister replied: "Because Afghanistan is next door."83 Kozyrev told 
TASS in February 1991 that an "extremist regime" in Kabul would present a 
serious threat to the stability of Soviet Central Asia.*4 Tadzhiks, Turkmens, and 
Uzbeks are found in large numbers along bom sides of the Soviet-Afghan 
frontier. The Soviet media frequently complained about the alleged efforts of 
Afghan agitators to proselytize Islam on Soviet territory.85 In June 1991 an 
Afghan pilot inadvertently revealed the vulnerability of the USSR's southern 
border to military attack when he mistakenly bombed a village in Soviet 
Tadzhikistan.86 The incident caused Tadzkik representatives to demand stronger 
border security from the Soviet KGB.17 Nor was the perceived threat from 
Islamic fundamentalism linked just to Soviet Central Asia. Following increased 
tension with Armenia, Azerbaijani demonstrators displayed portraits of Iran's 
Iman Khomeini to symbolize their identification with radical Islam.88 Najibullah 
himself pointed out to Soviet observers that a guerrilla victory would produce 
instability on the USSR's southern borders and encourage anti-Soviet agitation 
among Soviet Muslims.89 
Soviet officials also were concerned about damaging their credibility. 
They reportedly expressed apprehension that discarding Najibullah would 
tarnish their relations with other allies.90 Unmatched concessions also would 
have further undermined the USSR's already weaknegotiating position with the 
United States. One writer in Pravda, though acknowledging that the USSR 
possessed an interest in a quick end to the Afghan conflict, hastened to add "so 
that our foreign-policy department more decisively and convincely [sic] con-
ducts its negotiations with the American side on this issue," that a superpower 
agreement is not a "one-way street."91 
Unlike in Eastern Europe, where Western countries made clear they 
would not seek to exploit the Soviet withdrawal to undermine the USSR's 
legitimate security interests, in Afghanistan die United States and its regional 
allies seemed determined to establish a stringently anti-Soviet government 
adjacent to the USSR's vulnerable southern border. Reacting to American 
insensitiveness in this regard, as well as a desire to sustain a friendly buffer state, 
Soviet officials resolutely pursued what they perceived as an equitable outcome 
to the conflict. 
Another factor encouraging continued support for the Afghan govern-
ment was mat, before the failed coup, some Soviet officials probably feared that 
additional concessions on Afghanistan would have caused hardliners at home to 
suggest they were not adequately caring for Soviet interests. One of the reasons 
Shevardnadze resigned as Foreign Minister in December 1990 was allegedly his 
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frustration with the Soviet military ' s insistence that the USSR persist in backing 
Najibullah.92 
The power of the Afghan veterans in this respect should not be underes-
timated. While many soldiers wanted nothing more than to forget the conflict, 
others were concerned that their sacrifices were not rendered worthless by a 
Soviet decision to abandon Afghanistan to the insurgents. In the USSR 
Supreme Soviet, whose ranks included a number of Afghan veterans, a lobby 
claiming to represent the half-a-million soldiers who fought in Afghanistan 
insisted that their members desired continued "internationalist aid" to Kabul.93 
Such sentiments were particularly strong among the sixty thousand officers who 
had served in Afghanistan.94 Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov and the other 
former Afghan veterans participating in the First Army Conference of Interna-
tionalist Fighters in Moscow on 22 May 1991 called for additional Soviet 
military and economic aid to prevent the victory of Islamic fundamentalism.95 
The last commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Boris Gromov, exploited 
his position as Deputy Interior Minister to promote continued Soviet assistance 
to the Afghan government96 
Finally, the analyst should not overestimate the cost to Moscow of 
sustaining the Afghan regime. Compared with the economic and diplomatic 
burden of propping up its East European allies, the Afghan regime's needs were 
minimal. The most extensive deliveries involved conventional weapons, a 
commodity of which the USSR enjoyed a rare healthy surplus. Indeed, 
Schwarzkopf told the Senate that a substantial portion of the military equipment 
Moscow delivered to Kabul came from Eastern Europe.97 
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 
The problem facing efforts to establish peace in Afghanistan is that so 
many groups can veto a potential settlement Although the focus of this article 
is on past Soviet policies in Afghanistan, in the future local and regional actors 
will have the greatest impact on the outcome. As one US official lamented, 
"They can't deliver their Afghans, and we can't deliver ours."98 Despite the 
Soviet-American agreement to halt arms deliveries to their Afghan allies, and 
the subsequent collapse of the USSR, experts believe that the local combatants 
could continue to fight for at least several years thanks to their extensive 
stockpiles.99 
Najibullah certainly will seek to remain in power. Downplaying the 
Soviet-American agreement and the increased contacts between the Russians 
and the resistance, he told Agence-France Presse. "Let aie Afghans decide then-
own destiny without outside interference."100 Pointing to the pattern in Nicara-
gua, where the Sandinistas remained in office during the campaign, Najibullah 
also firmly dismissed proposals that he relinquish his post unless defeated in an 
election.101 Inhisownr>eaceproposals,heriasrepeatedlycalledforacease-fire, 
consultation among all Afghan groups (perhaps extending to the temporary 
incorporation of resistance leaders into his government or a joint commission/ 
transitional council), the return of the approximately five million Afghan 
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refugees, a termination of all foreign military assistance to the combatants, free 
elections under United Nations supervision, and the holding of a multinational 
conference to review Afghanistan's international status.102 Since the failed 
Soviet coup, his government has received aid from other countries, including 
India, Iran, and perhaps China.103 Government officials also hope that the West, 
replicating their policy shift toward Cambodia, will soon reassess its strategy 
and embrace their regime as a bastion against Islamic fundamentalism in the 
region.104 
Resistance leaders for their part continue to insist in public that they will 
neither negotiate with Najibullah, agree to a cease-fire with the Kabul regime, 
nor enter into a joint government with PDPA members. They have explicitly 
dismissed peace proposals that would permit Najibullah to remain in power 
during the election campaign, even if he transfered important powers to some 
other authority such as the proposed coordination body. Pir Syed Ahmed 
Gailani, a leader of one of the moderate resistance factions, stated in mid-
January 1992 that he would meet directly with the Kabul government "for the 
sole purpose of arranging a transfer of power. Other than that, we have nothing 
to talk about."103 Even if the current regime should collapse, it is questionable 
that a stable order would soon emerge throughout the country. Local field 
commanders, heads of government militias, and regional governors have 
established powerful satrapies and would probably vigorously resist a resur-
gence of central control. The king, often seen as a compromise transition figure, 
is old and perhaps out-of-touch because of his long exile in Italy. In addition, 
hostile divisions along ethnic affiliation have intensified since the Soviet 
withdrawal. As a European diplomat wryly observed, "The problem with 
Afghanistan is that everyone wants to be king but the king himself."106 
The international environment is also not very propitious for peace. 
Despite the suspension of Soviet and American arms shipments, private sources 
(perhaps with discreet official backing) in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have not 
halted their deliveries, and the Iranian government still sends weapons to its 
Afghan allies. Furthermore, the secular leaders of the newly-independent 
Central Asian republics have expressed concern about the prospect of an Islamic 
fundamentalist government in Kabul.107 They might back Najibullah or other 
anti-resistance forces to prevent such an outcome. The foreign ministers of 
several of these republics visited Kabul last fall and trade between Central Asia 
and Afghanistan is increasing.108 Afghan government officials now stress the 
historic and ethnic ties between Afghans and Central Asians, and suggest they 
are prepared if necessary to develop military ties between their government and 
their northern neighbors.10* 
CONCLUSION 
The USSR's strategy in Afghanistan proved remarkably successful. The 
Soviet government's decision to withdraw its troops, but still provide extensive 
aid to the Kabul government, redefined international perceptions of the conflict. 
For many observers, the USSR's military removal of support transformed a 
struggle for self-determination against an occupying power into a civil war 
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between a flexible government and an instransigent, foreign-sponsored, guer-
rilla movement Because Moscow's call for a coalition government appeared 
more reasonable than the resistance's insistence on total victory, other govern-
ments were forced to modify their position and accept an electoral solution in 
which Nadjibullah could participate. Hie military stalemate and die changing 
attitudes of other countries resulted in the USSR's influence in Afghanistan 
becoming more secure with each passing month. Only the unplanned collapse 
of the Soviet central government's authority after August 1991 undermined the 
strategy. 
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